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THE CONSTRUCTIONIST ANALYTICS 
OF INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE 
James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium 
F.., or the last half century, qualitative inquiry has focused increasingly on the socially constructed character of lived realities (see Denzin & Lincoln , 2005; Holstein & Gubrium, 
2008). Much of this has centered on the interactional constitu-
tiona! meaning in everyday life, the leading principle being that 
the world we live in and our place in it are not simply and evi -
dently "there;' but rather variably brought into being. Everyday 
realities are actively constructed in and through forms of social 
action. 'lbe principle supplies the basis for a constructionist 
I perspective on qualitative inquiry that is both an intellectual 
movement and an empirical research perspective that tran-
scends particular disciplines: 
With its growing popularity, however, the constructionist 
approach has become particularly expansive and amorphous. 
Often it seems that the lerm "constructionism" can be applied to 
virlually every research approach imaginable. James Jasper and 
Jeff Goodwin (2005), for example, have wryly noted, "We are all 
i social constructionists; almost" (p. 3). But there is a drawback 
to this popularity, because, as Michael Lynch (2008) suggests, 
the perspective may have become too diverse and diffuse to 
' adequately detlnc' or assess. In the process, constructionism 
sometimes loses its conceptual bearings. 
Elsewhere (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008), we have argued that 
constructionism resists a single portrait but is better understood 
as a mosaic of research eftorls, with diverse (but also shared) 
philosophical, theoretical, methodological, and empirical under-
pinnings. This does not mean, however, that just anything goes 
lInder the constructionist rubric. We should resist the temptation 
to conflate constructionism with other contemporary or post-
modern modes of qualitative inquiry; it is not synonymous with 
symbolic interactionis'ln, social phenomenology, or ethnometh· 
odology, for example, even as it shares their abiding concerns 
with the dynamics of social interaction. Nor should we equate all 
variants of constructionism. 
Darin Weinberg (2008) has argued that two important 
threads weave throughout the mosaic of conmuctionist 
thought: antifoundationalist sensibilities and a resistance to 
reiBcation. These threads, of course, also wend through early 
stlitementsof analytic philosophy, critical theory, pragmatism, 
and the hermeneutic tradition -(see Weinberg, 2008). Joel Best 
(2008) traces the origins of the term "social constructionism" 
within sociology as far back as the early-20th century. He notes 
numerous appearances of the term in disciplines as varied as 
anthropology, history, and political sdence in the earlier parts 
of that century. At the same time, proto-constructionist sensi· 
biliries were evident in the work of a variety of scholars indud-
ing W. 1. Thomas (193 1), George Herbert Mead (1934), Alfred 
Schutz (1962, 1964, 1967, 1970), and Herhert llIumer (1969), 
among many others. Best, however, suggests that the expansive 
. popularity of the pcrspective, or perhaps the term, burst forth in 
the wake of the 1966 publication of Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge. . 
This chapter outlines the development of a constructionist 
analytics of interpretive practice, a particular variant of con-
struCtionist inquiry. In our view, the approach unites enough 
common elements to cunstitute a recognizable, vibrant research 
program. The program centers on tJre interactional constitution 
of lived realities within discernible contexts of social interac-
tion. We use the term "analytic." because the approach and its 
variants produce understandings of the construction process by 
way of distinctive analytic ,'ocabularies, what Blwnel' (i969) 
might ha,'e called a systematically linked set of "sensitizing 
concepts" spare enough not to overshadow the empirical, yet 
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robust enough to reveal its constructionist distinctive contours. 
Our analytics of interpretive practice is decidedly theoretical, 
not just descriptive, but concertedly minimalist in its concep-
tual thrust. The chapter's aim is neither historic nor comprehen-
sive. Rather, it looks more narrowly at the development of a 
particular strain of constructionist studies that borrows liber-
ally, if somewhat promiscuously, from the traditions of social 
phenomenology, ethnomethodology, ordinary language philos-
ophy, and foucauldian discourse analysis. 
I!I CONCEPTUAL SOlJ]KES 
The constructionist analyt ics of interpretive practice has diverse 
sources. For decades, constructionist researchers have attempted 
to document the agentie processes- the haws-by"which 
social reality is constructed, managed, and sustained. Alfred 
Schutls (1962, 1964, 1967, 1970) social phenomenology, Berger 
and Luckmann's (1966) social constfllctionism;'ancf ptocess-
oriented strains of symbolic interactionism (e.g., Blumer, 1969; 
Hewitt, 1997; Weigert, 1981) have offered key elements to this 
constructionist project. More reccntly, ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis (CA) have atguably supplied a more com-
municatively detailed dimension by specifying the interactive 
procedures thtough. which social order is accomplished (see' 
lluckholdt & Gubrium, 1979; Garfmkel, 1967,2002,2006; Heri-
tage, 1984; Holstein, 1993; Lynch, 1993; Maynard & Clayman, 
1991; Mehan & Wood, 1975; Pollner, 1987, \ 991 ).1 Discursive 
constructionism (see Pottet & Hepburn, 2008)-a variant of 
discourse analysis bearing strong resemblances to CA- also 
has emerged to examine everyday descriptions, claims, reports, 
assertions, and allegations as they contribute to the construe-
tion and maintenance of social order. 
A related set of concerns has emerged along with ethnometh-
o~ologis traditional interest in how social action and order are 
accomplished, reffecting a heretofore suspended intere,t in what 
is being accomplished, under what conditions, and out of what 
resources. Such traditionally naturali,tic questions hal'e been 
revived, with greater analytic sophi,tication and with a view 
toward the rich, varied, and conse'luential conte,,'ts of social 
construction. Analyse, of reality construction are now re-engaging 
questions conccrnulg the broad cultural and the institutional 
contexts of meaning making and social order. The empirical 
horizons, while still centered on processes of social accomplish-
ment, are increasingly viewed in terms of what we have called 
"interpretive practice" - the constellation of procedure" condi· 
tions, and resourc~s through which reality is apprehended, 
undwtood, organized, and conveyed in everyday life (Gubrium 
& Holstein, 1997; Holstein, 1993; Holstein & Gubrium, 2000b). 
The idea of interpretive practice turns us to both the hows and 
, the whats of social reality; its empirical purview relares to both 
how people methodically construct their experiences and their 
worlds and the contextual configurat ions of meaning and insti· 
tutional life that inform and shape reality-constituting activity. 
Thi, attention to both the hows and the whats of the social con-
struction process echoes Karl Marx's (1956) ma.xim that people 
ac tively construct their worlds but not completely on, or in, their 
own terms. 
Thi, concern for constructive action-in-context not only 
makes it possible to understand more tully the construction 
process, but also foregrounds the realities themselves that enter 
into and are reflexively produced by the process. Attending 
closely to the how,' of the construction process informs us of the 
mechanisms by which social forms are brought into being in 
everyday life, but it may shortchange the shape and distribution ' 
of these realities in their own right. The whats of social reality 
tend to be deemphasized in research that attends exclusively to 
the haws of its construction. We lose track of consequential 
whats, wilens, and where> that locate the concrete, yet con· 
structed, realities that emerge. 
Ethnomethodological Sensibilities 
Ethnomethodology is perhaps the quintessential howana· 
lytic enterprise in qualitative inquiry. While indebted to Edmund 
Hu>serl's (1970) philosophical phenomenology and Schutz's >" 
social phenomenology (sec Holstein & Gubrium, 1994), ethnuc t ;;, 
,i;etliot!-()Iogyslruck a new course, addressing the 
order by combining a "phlelli>meno1log:ical sensilbili ty" I(Maynanl 
& Clayman, 1991) with a paramount research concern for 
mechanisms of practical action (Garfmkel, 1967; Lynch, 
From an ethnomethodological standpoint, the social 
iacticity is accompli,hed by way of members' discernible 
ac tional work, the mechanics of which produces and ma!inta,illS,:: 
the accountable circumstances of their lives.' Ettmomellho(jQI~, ! 
g i~ts focus on how members (ldo" sociallifc, aiming in particullif; , 
to doc ument the distinct processes by which they con,:retel~l'. 
construct and stlstain d,e objects and appearances of the 
Iforld. The central phenomenon of interest is the in situ 
ied activity and the practical production of accounts (M('YllOJd, ; 
2003). This leads to inquiries into how mundane practices are 
ac tually carried out, such as doing gender (Garfinkel, 1%1),-
couqting people and things (sec Martin & Lynch, 2009), or 
delivering good or bad news (see Maynard, 2003). 
The policy of"ethnomethodological indifference" ('C iarfinkcl '. " 
& Sa cks, 1970) prompts ethnotnethodologists to tempO[(lf4Y': 
suspend all commitments to a priori or privileged versiarlS 9t ':' 
the social world. This turn, the researcher's attention to 
members accomplish a sense of social order. Social realities " .•
stich as crime or mental illness are not taken for "'o,,,,,,i· 
i ostead, belief in them is temporarily ",spended in order 
make visible how they become realities for those rnnlcernRl ',' 
This brings into view the ordinary constitutive work 
duces the locally unchallenged appearance of stable 
1 
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This policy vigorously resists judgmental characterizations of 
thecorreetness of members' activities (see Lynch, 2008). Con-
trary to the common sociological tendency to ironicize and 
criticize commonsense formulations from the standpoint of 
. correct sociological understanding, ethnomethod-
ology takes members' practical reasoning for what it is-
circumstantially adequate ways of interpersonally constitut-
the world at hand. The abiding 'guideline is succinctly 
conveyt:dby Melvin PoUner's "Don't argue with the members!" 
(pel:sonal communication; see Gubrium & Holstein, 2011). 
Ethnomethodological research is keenly attuned to naturally 
occurring talk and social interaction, orienting to them as con-
~itutive elements of the settings studied (see Atkinson & Drew, 
;979; Maynard, 1984, 1989,2003; Mehan & Wood, 1975; Sacks, 
. 1972). This has taken different empirical directions, in part 
depending upon whether the occasioned dynamics of social 
action and practical reasoning or the structure of talk is empha-
sized. Ethnographic stud.ies tend to focus on locally accountable 
iocial act ion and the settings within which soci.al interaction 
I the practical realities in question. Such studies con-
~der the situated content of talk in relation to local meaning 
stnrctures (see Gubrium, 1992; Holstein, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 
Miller, 1991; Pollner, 1987; Wieder, 1988). They combine 
attention to how social action and order is built up in everyday 
communication with detailed descriptions of place settings as 
those settings and their local understandings and perspectives 
sem to mediate the meaning of what is said in the course of 
sodal interaction. The texts produced from such analytics are 
descriptive of everyday life, with both conversational 
emacts from the settings and ethnographic accounts of inter-
action being used to convey the methodical production of the 
matter in question. To the extent the analysis of talk in 
to social interaction and setting is undertaken, this 
to take the form of (non-Foucauldian) discourse analysis, 
more or less critically orients to how talk, conversation, 
other communicative_ processes are used to organize social 
Variations on this analytic have also emergedin a form 
of discuLrsi'le constructionism that resonates strongly with eth-
noml.ethodclloi(y and CA, but orients more to epistcmics and 
(kntlwle'dge construction (Potter & Hepburn, 2008; also see 
;~ik,andt'r, 2008; Potter, 1996, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
. n"" . . , L""",' Wooffitt, 2005). 
Studies that emphasize the structure of talk itself focus on the 
,"",,,,,ltin,nal "machinery"through which social acti.on emerges. 
focus here is on the . sequential, utterance-by-utterance, 
structuring features of talk or "talk-in-interaction;' a 
term of reference in conversation analysis (see Heritage, 
. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Silverman, 1998; Zim-
1988). The analyses produced from such studies are 
explications of the communicative processes by which 
methodically and sequentially construct their concerns 
conversational practice. Often bereft of ethnographic detail 
except for brieflead-ins that describe place settings, the analytic 
sense conveyed is that biographical and social particulars can 
be understood as artifacts of the unfolding conversational 
machinery, although the analysis of what is called "institutional 
talk" or "talk at work" has struck a greater balance with place 
settings in this regard (see.for example, Drew & Heritage, 1992). 
While some contend that Clls connection to ethnomethodology 
is tenuous because of this lack of concern with ethnographic 
detail (Atkinson, 1988; Lynch, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 1994; for 
counterarguments see Maynard & Clayman, 1991 and ten Have, 
1990), CA clearly shares ethnomethodology's interest in the 
local and methodical construction of social action (Maynard & 
Clayman, 1991). 
Recently, Garfinkel, 1.ynch, and others have elaborated what 
they refer to as a "postanalytic" ethnomethodology that is less 
inclined to universalistic generalizations regarding the endur-
ing structures or machinery of social interaction (see Garfinkel, 
2002,2006; Lynch, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 1996). This program of 
research centers on the highly localized competencies that con-
stitute specific domains of everyday "work;' especially the 
(bench)work of astronomers (Garfinkel, Lynch , & Livingston, 
198 1), biologists and neurologists (Lynch, 1985), forensic scien-
tists (Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jenkins, 2008) and mathemati-
cians (Livingston, 1986), among many others. The aim is to 
'document the "haecceit}'" - the "just thisness" -of social prac-
tices withilr circumscribed dQmains of knowledge and activity 
(l.ynch, 1993). The practical details of the real-time work of 
these activities are viewed as an incarnate feature ofthe knowl-
edges they produce. It is impossible to separate the knowledges 
from the highly particularized occasions of their production. 
The approach is theoretically minimalist in that it resists a pri-
ori conceptualization or categorization, especially historical 
time, while advocating detailed descriptive studies of the spe-
cific, local practices that manifest order and render it account-
able (Bogen & Lynch, 1993). 
Despite their success at displaying a panoply of social pro-
duction practices, CA and postanalytic ethnomcthodology in 
their separate ways tend to di sregard an important balance in 
the conceptualizations of talk, setting, and social interaction 
that was evident in Garfinkel's early work and Harvel' Sacks's 
(1992) pioneering lectures on conyersational practice (see 
Silverman, 1998). Neither Gartinkel nor Sacks envisioned the 
machinery of conversation as productive of recognizable social 
forms in its own right. Attention to the constitutive hows of 
social realities was balanced with an eye to the meani ngful 
whats. Settings, cultural understandings, and their everyday 
mediations were viewed as reflexively interwoven with talk and 
social interaction. Sacks, in particular, understood culture to be 
a matter of practice, something that served as a resource for 
discerning the possible linkages of utterances and exchanges. 
Whether they wrote of (Garfinkel's) "good organizational rea-
sons" or (Sacks's) "membership categorization devices;' both 
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initially avoided the reduction of social practice to highly local-
ized or momentary haecceities of any kind. 
Some of the original promise of ethnomethodology may 
have been short-circuited as CA and postanalytic ethnometh-
odology have increasingly restricted their investigations to the 
relation between social practices and the immediate accounts of 
those practices (see Pollner 20lla, 2011b, 20llc). A broader 
constructionist analytics aims to retain ethnomethodology's 
interactional sensibilities while extending its scope to both the 
constitutive and constituted whats of everyday life. Michel Fou-
cault, among others, is a valuable resource for such a project. 
Foucauldian Illspirations 
If ethnomethodology documents the accomplishment of 
everyday life at the interactional level, Foucault undertook a 
parallel project in a different empirical register. Appearing on 
the analytic stage at about the same time as ethnomethodology 
in the early 1960s, Foucault considers how historically and cul-
turally located systems of power/knowledge construct subjects 
and their worlds. Foucauldians refer to these systems as "dis-
courses;' emphasizing that they are not merely bodies of ideas, 
ideologies, or other symbolic formulations, but are also working 
attitudes, modes of address, terms of reference, and courses of 
action suffused into social practices. Fuucault (1972, p. 48) him-
self explains that discourses are not "a mere intersection of 
things and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest, 
visible, colored chain of words." Rather, they are "practices that 
systematically form the objects [and subjects I of which they 
speak" (p. 49). Even the design of buildings such as prisons 
reveals the social logic that specifies ways of interpreting 
persons and the physical and social landscapes they occupy 
(Follcault, 1979). 
Similar to the ethnomethodological view of the reflexivity of 
social interaction, Foucault views discourse as operating reflex-
ively, at once b.oth constituting and meaningfully describing the 
world and its subjects. But, for Foucault, the accent is as much 
on the constructive whats that discourse constitutes as it is on 
the hows of discursive technology. While this implies an ana-
lytic emphasis on the culturally "natural;' Foucault's treatment 
of discourse as social practice suggests, in particular, the 
importance of understanding the practices of subjectivity. If he . 
offers a vision of subject' and objects constituted through dis-
course, he also allows for all unwittingly active subiect who 
simultaneously shapes and puts discourse to work in construct-
ing o~r inner lives and social worlds (Best & Kellner, 1991; 
Foucault, 1988) . 
Foucault is particularly concerned with social locations or 
institutional sites- the asylum, the hospital, and the prison, for 
example-that specify the practical operation of discourses, 
lin king the discourse of particular subjectivities with tlle con-
struction of lived experience. like ethnomethodology, there is 
an interest in the constitutive quality of systems of 
is an orientation to practice that views lil'ed 
subjectivities as always already embedded and 
their discursive conventions. 
Several commentators have pointed to the 
what Foucault (1980) refers to as systems of"po~;erl\:n( 
(or discourses) and ethnomethodology's fornllliatiol 
constitutive power oflanguage use (Atkinson, 
& Holstein, 1997; Heritage, 1.997; Miller, 1997b; 
Prior, 1997; Silverman, 1993). The conresponden,,:sug! 
what Foucault's analytics ·documents historically as 
in-practice" in varied institutional or cultural sites 
counterpart in what ethnomethodology's 
((discursive practice" in varied forms of social 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 2000b, 2003)' We use 
discourses-in-practice and discursive pra,c tICl'~11h1 
the chapter to flag the parallel concerns. 
While ethnomethodologists and Foucauldiaus 
different intellectual traditions and work in distinct 
registers, their similar concerns for social ora,:ti,,:,'" 
they both attend to the constitutive reflexivity 
Neither discursive practice nor discOllfS<:-in-practicei: 
as being caused or explained by external social 
nal motives. Rather, they are taken to be the one:ratin, 
nism of social life itself, as actuaUy known or 
tcal time and in concce.te places. For both, "nm"'" Ii, 
articulation of distinctive forms of social life as 
the application of particular reSOLlrces by some to 
lives of others. While discourses-in-practice are 
"regimens/regimes" or lived patterns of action 
(historically and institutionally) "discipline" 
adherents' worlds, and discursive practice is 
dynamics of talk and interaction that constitute 
the practices reter in common to the lived 
accomplishment of society. 
[f ethnomethodologists emphasize how merllbersU! 
day methods to account for their activities and 
Foucault (1979) makes us aware of the re.lated 
possibility for what the results are likely to ur. I'U! '''illl 
Western postindustrial society, to seriously think 
and voodoo as equally viable paradigms for 
sickness and healing would seem idiosyncratic, 
ous, in most conventional situations. The po.,.er (IE 
discourse partially lies in its ability to be "seen 
in its ability to appear as the only possibility wDJUe om, 
bilities are outside the plausible realm. 
It bears repeating that both ethnonllet~,odc,lqgll 
foucauldian approaches to empirical material 
not explanatory theories in the causal sense. 
understood, theory purports to explain the state of 
question. It responds to why concerns, such as 
cide rate is rising or why individuals are suffering 
it 
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Ethnomethodology and the Fo ucauldian project, in contrast, 
aim to am .... \'er how it .is that individual experience is under-
stood in particular terms such as these. They are pretheoretical 
this sense, respectively seeking to arrive at an understand-
ingofhow the subject matter of theory comes into existence 
in the first place, and of what the subject of theory might 
possibly become, The parallel lies in the common goal of 
documenting the practiced stuff of such realities, 
Still , this remains a parallel -not a shared-scheme. 
Because Foucault's project (and most foucauldian projects) 
operates in a historical register, real-time talk and social inter-
action are understandably missing from empirical materials 
uader examination (but see Kendall & Wickham, 1999, for 
example). While Foucault himself points to sharp turns in the 
discursive formations that both shape and inform the shifting 
realities of varied institutional spheres, contrasting extant social 
forms with the ''birth'' of new ones, he provides little or no sense 
of the everyday interact ional technology by which this is 
achieved (see Atkinson, 1995, Holstein & Gubrium, 2000b), Cer-
tainly, h, elaborates the broad birth of new technologies, such as 
the emergence of new regimes of surveillance in medicine and 
modern criminal justice systems (Foucault, 1975, 1979), but he 
does not provide us with a view of how these operate on the 
ground. The everyday hows, in other words, are largely missing 
from Foucauldian analyses. 
Conversely, ethnomethodology's commitment to document-
ing the real-time, interactive processes by which social action 
and order arc rendered visible and accountable precludes a 
broad substantive perspective on constitutive resources, possi-
bilities, and limiLalions, Such whats are largely absent in ethno-
methodological work. It is one thing to show in interactive detail 
that our everyday encounters with reality are ongoing aCCOffi-
pli,hments, bUL it is quite another to derive an understanding of 
what the general parameters of those everyday encounters 
might be, The machinery of talk-in-interaction tells us little 
about the maS5ive resources that are taken up in, and that guide, 
the operation of conversation, or about the consequences of 
producing particular results and not others, each of which is an 
important ingredient of practice. Members speak their worlds 
and their subjectivities, but they also articulate particular. forms 
of life as they do so, foucauldianconsiderations offer ethno-
methodology an analytiC sensitivity Lo the discursive opportu-
nities and possibilities at work in talk and social interaction, 
without casting them as external templates tor the everyday 
product ion of social ordeL . 
D1MF.NSIONS OF CO)!STRCCTlO)!IST ANALYTICS 
The cOllstrucljonist analyt ics of interpretive practice rellects 
, both ethoomethodologieal and Foucauldian impulses, It capi-
: talizel on key sensibilities from their parallel projects, but it is 
not simply another attempt at bridging the so-called macro-
micro divide, That debate usually centers on the question of 
how to conceptualize the relationship between preexisting 
larger and smaller social forms, the assumption being that 
these are categorically distinct an4 separately discernible. 
Issues raised in the debate perpetuate the distinction between, 
say, social systems on the one hand, and social interaction, on 
the other, 
In contrast, those who consider the ethnomethodological 
and Foucauldian projects to be parallel operations focus their 
attention instead on Lhe interactional, institutional, and cultural 
variabi lities of socially constitut ing discursive practice or dis-
courses-in-practice, as the case might be, They aim to docu-
ment how the social construction process is shaped across 
various domains of everyday life, not in how separate theories 
of macro and micro domains can be linked together for a fuller 
account of social organization, Doctrinaire accounts of Garfin-
kel, Sacks, Foucault, and others may continue to sustain a vari-
ety of distinct projects, but these projects are not likely to 
inform one another; nor will they lead to profitable dialogue 
between dogmatic practitioners who insist on viewing them-
selyes as speaking different analytic languages, In our \~ew, 
what we need is an openness to new, perhaps hybridized, ana-
lylics of reality comtruction at the crossroads of institutions, 
,culture, and social interaction. 
Beyond Ethnomethodology 
Some ethnomethodologieally informed varieties of CA have 
turned in this direction by analyzing the sequential machinery 
of talk-in-interaction as it is patterned by institutional context, 
bringing a greater concern for the whats of social life into the 
picture. Some field-based studies with ethnomethodological 
sensibilities have extended their conCerns beyond the narrow 
holVs of social interaction to include a wider interest in what is 
produced through interaction, in response to whal social condi-
tions, Still other forms of discourse analysis have similarly 
focu sed on the discursive resources brought to bear in situated 
social. interaction or the kinds of objects and subjects consti-
tuted though interact ion (see Wooffitt, 2005). These trends have 
broadened the empi ri.cal and analytic purview, 
CA studies of "talk at work;' for example, aim to specify how 
tile "simplest systematics" of ordinary conversation (Sacks, 
Schegloft; & Jefferson, 1974) is shaped in various ways by tile 
reflexively constructed speech envirorunents of particular inter-
actional regimes (see Boden & Zimmerman, 199 1; Drew & 
Heritage, 1992), Ethnomethodologically oriented ethnogra-
phers approach the problem from another direction by asking 
how institutions and their respective subjcctivities ate brought 
into being, managed, and sustained in and through members' 
social interaction (or "reality work") (see Atkinson, 1995; 
Dingwall, Eekelaar, & Murray, 1983; Emerson, 1969; Emerson 
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& Messinger, 1977; Gubrium, 1992; Holstein, 1993, Mehan, 1979; 
Miller, 1991, 1997a). Foucault has even been inserted explicitly 
into the discussion, as researcbers have drawn links between 
everyday discursive practice and discourses-in-practice to doc-
ument in local detail how the formulation of everyday texts such 
as psychiatric case records or coroners' reports reproduce insti-
tutional discourses (see Prior, 1997). Others taking related paths 
have noted how culturally and institutionally situated dis-
courses are interactionally brought to bear, to produce social 
objects and institutionalized interpersonal practices (sec Hcpburn, 
1997, and Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). 
In their own fashions, these efforts consider both the hows 
and the whats of reality construction. Rut thisis analytically 
risky business. Asking how questions without having an integral 
way of getting an analytic handle on what questions renders 
concerns with the wltat.' rather arbitrary. While talk-ill-interaction 
is locally "artful;' as Garfinkel (1967) puts it, not just anything 
gocs. On the other hand, if we swi og too far analytically in the 
direction of contextual or cultural imperatives, we end up wi th 
the cultural, institutional, or judgmental "dopes" that Gartlnkel 
(l967) decried. 
Accenting AnalytiC Interplay 
To broaden and enrich cthnomethodology's analytic scope--__ 
and repertoire, researchers have extended its purview to the 
institutional and cultural whats that come into play in social 
interaction. This has not been a historical extension, SUdl as 
Foucault might pursue, although that certainly is not ruled out_ 
In our own constructionist analytics, we have resurrected a kind 
of "cautious" (self-conscious) naturalism that addresses the 
practical and sited production of everyday life (Gubrium, 
1993a). More decidedly constructionist in its concern for taken-
for-granted realities, this balances how and what concerns, 
enriching the analytic impulses of each. ouch an analytics 
focuses on the int"'1'lay, not the synthesis, of discursive practice 
and discourses-in-practice, the tandem projects of cth nometh-
odolog)' and foucauldian discourse analysis. In doing so, the 
analytics assiduously avoids theorizi ng social forms, lest the 
discursive practices associated with the construction of these 
forms be taken tor granted. By the same token, it concertedly 
keeps institutional or cultural discourses in view, lest they be 
dissolved into localized displays of practical reasoning or forms 
of sequential organization for talk- in-interaction. first and tore-
most, a constructioni.st analytics of interpretive practice has 
taken us, in real time, to the "going concerns}) of everyday Jjfe, as 
Everett Hughes (1984) liked to call social institutiuns. This 
approach focuses attention on how members artfully put dis-
tinct discourses to work as they constitute their social worlds. 
Interplay connotes the acceptance of a dynamic relation.ship, 
not a to-be-resolved tension, between the hows and whats of 
interpretive practice. We have intentionally avoided analytically 
privileging either discursive practice or discourse.s-in-practice. 
Putting it in ethnomethodological terms, in our view the aim of 
a constructionist analytics is to document the int,erolavbel1<e1'11 
the practical reason ing and interactive machinery entailed in • 
constructing a sense of everyday reality, on the one naIlU, ,IllO 
the institutional conditions, resources, and related d,i's, cowrSe! • 
that substantively nourish and interpretively mediate interac-
tion on the other. Putting it in Foucal~dian terms, the goal is 
describe the interplay between institutional discourses and 
"dividing practices" that constitute local subjectivities and i 
domains of experience (Foucault 1965) . The symmetry of fe~- ' 
world practice has encouraged us to give equal treatment to 
both its articulative and substantive engagements. 
Constructionist researchers have increasingly emphasized 
the interplay between the two sides of interpretive i 
They are scrutin i,ing both the artful processes and thosubstao' 
tive conditions of meaning making and social order, even if the 
commitment to a multiiaceted analytics sometimes remains 
implicit. Douglas Maynard (19R9), for example, notes that most : 
ethnographers have traditionally asked, "How do parl:icipan[\. 
see things?" while ethnomethodologically informed disc:ou"", : 
studies have asked, "How do participants do things?" WhllleJu. 
own work typically begins with the later question, 
cautions us not to ignore the former. He explains that, in 
interest of studying how members do things, ethnofnettlOd· 
ologie-a! studies have tended to deemphasiZe factors that 
tion their actions. Recogniling that "external social .s t nJCtul re ~l · 
used as a resource for social interaction at the same time as 
co nstituted within it" (p. 139); Maynard suggests that 
graphic and discourse studies can be mutually infimrlati", 
allowing researchers to better document the ways in which -
"structure of interaction, while being a local production, 
taneously enacts matters whose origins are externally .. 
(p. 139). "In addition to knowing how people 'see their worka-
day worlds;' writes Maynard (p. 144), researchers should try to 
understand how people "discover and exhibit featureS of 
worlds so that they can be 'seen:" 
Maynard (2003) goes on to note signitlcant differences in the • 
way talk and interaction typically are treated in conversation 
analytic versus more naturalistic, ethnographic approaches to . 
social process. His own work, like many similarly groundedt:t . 
studies, exploits what Maynard terms the "limited amnity' 
between CA concerns and methods and more field-based eth-
nographic techniques and se)lsibil ities (see Maynard, 2003,. 
chapter 3)_ While a broad-based constructionist analytics would 
argue for a deeper, more "mutual affinity" (lvlaynard, 21103) _, 
between attempts to describe the haws and whats of socialprac-
tice, there is clearly common ground, with much of Ihe 
enee a matter of emphasis or analytic point of departure. 
Expressing similar interests and concerns, Hugh H _L_",_ 
developed a discourse-oriented program of "constiUltive 
nography" that puts "structure and structuring activities 
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equal footing by showing how the social facts of the world emerge 
from structuring work to become external and constraining" 
(1979, p.18, emphasis in the original). Mehan examines "contras-
tive" instances of interpretation in order to describe both fbe 
'distal" and "proximate" featnres of the reality -constituting work 
people do '\\~fbin institutional, cultural, and historical contexts" 
11991, pp. 73, 81). 
Beginning from similar ethnomethodological and discourse 
analytic footings, David Silverman (1993) likewise attends to 
the institutional venues of talk and social construction (Silverman, 
1985,1997). Seeking a mode of qualitative inquiry that exhibits 
both constitutive and contextual impulses, he suggests that 
discourse studies that consider the varied institutional contexts 
o!talk bring a new perspective to qualitative inquiry. Working in 
the same vein, Gale Miller (1994, 1997b) has proposed "ethnog-
raphies of institutional disconrse" that serve to document "the 
ways in which setting members use discursive resources in 
organizing their practical actions, and how members' actions 
are constrained by the resources available in the settings" 
(Miller, 1994, p. 280). This approach makes explicit overtures to 
both conversation analysis and Foucauldian discourse analysis 
(see Miller, 1997a, and Weinberg, 2005) for rigorous empirical 
demonstrations of analytic interplay. 
Dorothy Smith (1987, 1990a, 1990b) has been similarly 
explicit in addressing a version of the interplay between the 
whats and hows of social life from a feminist point of view, 
pointing to the critical consciousness made possible by the 
perspective. Hers has been an analytics initially informed by 
ethnomethodological and, increasingly, foucauldian sensibil-
ities. Moving beyond ethnomethodo!ogy, she calls for what 
she refers to as a "dialectics of discourse and the everyday" 
(Smith, 1990a, p. 202). 
A concern for interplay, however, should not result in inte-
grating an analytics of discursive practice with an analytics of 
discourse-in-practice. To integrate one with the other is to 
reduce the empirical_purview of a parallel enterprise. Reduc-
ing the analytics of discourse-in-practice into discursive 
practice risks losing the lessons of attending to institutional 
difterences and cultural configurations as they mediate, and 
are not "just talked into being" through, social interaction. 
Conversely, figuring discursive practice as the mere residue of 
institutional discourse risks a totalized marginalization of 
local artfulness. 
Analytic Bracketing 
A constructionist analytics that eschews synthesis or inte-
gration requires procedural flexibility and dexterity fbat cannot 
be captured iu mechanical scriptures or formulas. Rather, the 
analytic process is more like a skilled juggling act, alternately 
concentrating on fbe myriad haws and whats of everyday life. 
This requires a new form of bracketing to capture the interplay 
between discursive practice and discourses-in-practice. We 
refer to this technique of oscillating indifference to the con-
struction and realities of everyday life as "analytic bracketing" 
(see Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). While we have given it a name, it 
resonates anonymously in ofber constructionist analytics. 
Recall that ethnomethodology's interest in fbe hows by 
which realities are produced requires a studied, temporary 
indiffereuce to those realities. Ethnomefbodologists typically 
begin their analysis by setting aside belief in the objectively real 
in order to bring into view fbe everyday practices by which 
subjects, objects, and events come to have an accountable sense 
of being observable, rational, and orderly. 'fhe ethnomethod-
ological project moves forward from there, documenting how 
discursive practice constitutes social action and order by iden-
tif)~ng the particular interactional mechanisms at play. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (J 953, p. J 9) is instructive as he advocates taking 
language "off holiday" in order to make visible how language 
works to produce the objects it is ofberwise viewed as princi-
pally describing. 
Analytic bracketing works somewhat differently. It is 
employed throughout analysis, not just at the start. As analysis 
proceeds, the researcher intermittently orients to everyday 
realities as both fbe products of members reality-constructing 
procedures and as resources from which realities are reflexively 
'constituted. At one moment, the researcher may be indifferent 
to the snuctures of everydey life in order to document their 
production through discursive practice. In the next analytic 
move, he or she brackets discursive practice in order to assess 
the local availability, distribution, and/or regulation of resources 
for reality construction. In YVittgensteinian terms) this trans-
lates into attending to both language-at -work and language-on-
holiday, alternating considerations of how languages games, in 
particular institutional discourses, operate in everyday life and 
what games are likely to come into play at particular times and 
places. In Foucauldian terms, it leads to alternating consider-
ations of discourses-in-practice on the one hand and the locally 
Hne-grained documentation of related discursive practices on 
the other. 
Analytic bracketing amounts to an orienting procedure for 
alternately focusing on the whats tllen the haws of interpretive 
practice (or vice versa) in order to assemble both a contextually 
scenic and a contextually constitutive picture of everyday 
language-in-use. The objective is to move back and forth 
behveen discursive practice and discourses-in-practice) docu-
menting each in turn, and making informative references to the 
otller in the process. Eifber discursive machinery or available dis-
courses and/or constraints becomes the provisional phenome-
non, while interest in fbe other is temporarily deferred, but not 
forgotten. The analysis of the constant interplay between the 
hows and whats of interpretive practice mirrors the lived interplay 
between social interaction and its immediate surroundings, 
resources) restraints) and going concerns. 
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Because discursive practice and discourses-in-practice are 
mutually constitutil'e, one cannot argue definitively that analysis 
should begin or end with either one, although there are predilec-
tions in this regard. Smith (1987, 199Oa, 199Ob), for example, 
advocates beginning "where people are"; we take her to mean 
the places where people are concretely located in the institu-
tional landscape of everyday life. Conversely, conversation ana-
lysts insist on beginning with discursive practice (i.e., everyday 
conversation), even while a variety of unanalyzed whats typi-
cally inform their efforts. 
Wherever one starts, neither the cultural and institutional 
details of discourse nor its real-time engagement in social inter-
action predetermines the other. If we set aside the need for an 
indisputable resolution to the question of which comes first, 
last, or has priority, we can designate a suitable point of depar-
ture and proceed from there, so long as we keep firmly in mind 
that the interplay within interpretive practice requires that we 
mOl'e hack and forth analytically between its facets. In the ser-
vice of not reifying the components, researchers continuously 
remind themselves that the analytic task centers on the dialec-
tics of two fi elds of play, not the reproduction of one by the other. 
While we advocate no rule for where to begin, we need not 
fret that the overall task is impossible or logically incoherent. 
Maynard (1998, p. 344), for example, compares analytic bracket-
ing to "wanting to ride trains that are going in different direc-
tions, initially hopping on one and then somehow jwnping to 
the other:' He asks, "How do you jump from one train to another 
when they are going in different directions?" The question is, in 
fact, merely an elaboration of the issue of how one brackets in 
the first place, which is, of course, the basis for Maynard's and 
other ethnomethodologists' and conversation analysts' own 
projects. The answer is simple: knowledge of the principle of 
bracketing makes it possible. Those who bracket the lifeworld or 
treat it indifferently, as the case might be, readily set aside 
aspects of social reality every time they get to work on their 
respective corpuses of empirical materia1.!t becomes as routine 
as rising in the morning, having breakfast, and going to the 
workplace:' On the other hand, the desire to operationalize 
bracketing of any kind, analytic bracketing included, into 
explicitly codified and sequenced procedural mOves would turn 
bracketing into a set of recipe-like, analytic directives, some-
thing surely to be avoided. We would assume that no one, except 
the most recalcitrant operationalist, would waD! to substitute a 
recipe book for an analytic •. ' 
The alternating.tocus on discursive practice and discourses-
in-practice reminds us not to appropriate either one naively 
into our analysis. [t help .. sustainethnomethodology's impor-
tant aim of distinguishing between members' resources and 
our own. Analytic bracketing is always substantively tempo-
rary. It resists full-blown attention to discourses as systems of 
power/knowledge, separate from how these operate . in lived 
experience. It also is enduringly empirical in that it docs not 
take the everyday operation of discourses for 
truths of a setting (Olll court.' 
Resisting Totalization 
Located at the crossroads 
discourses-in -practice, a mr""nc";nr,;,I,n,, Iv';mco,\", 
analytic totalization or reduction. It accommodates 
cal realities of choice and action, allowing the analytic 
to capture the interplay of structure and process. It 
propensity of a Foucauldian analytics to view all 
as artifacts of particular regimes of po'wer/kn.owled%e,] 
in relation to the broad sweep of his "histories of the . 
Foucault was inclined to overemphasiu the . 
discourses in constructing the horizons of meaning.; 
times or places, conveying the sense that d.·iscoUI":S lui 
the nuances of ever)'day life. A more interactionalIy 
analytics of discourse- one operating in tandem wuh 
discursive practice-resists this tendency. 
Because interpretive practice is mediated by 
through institutional objectives and funct ioning, 
of power/knowledge can be discerned in the myriad 
cerns of everyday life. Yet, those matters that one 
site brings to bear are not necessar ily what another 
practice. Institutions constitute distinct, \'etsornetim~1 Ql 
ping, realities. V\~,i1c an_organized setllill~: m"y d''Ploy, 
confers agency or subjectivit y upon individuals, for 
another may constitute subjectivity along different lines 
example, Gubrium, 1992.: Miller, 1997a; Weinberg, 
If interpretive practice is complex and fluid, it is 
arbitrary.Jn the practice of everyday life, discourse' 
in myriad sites and is socially variegated; actors 
build up their intersubjective realities in Glvers",IO(:atlrl 
and biographically informed terms. This allows 
slippage in how discourses do their work; it is far 
the apparently uniform, hegemonic regimes of 
edge in some Foucauldian readings. Discernible social 
tion nonetheless is evident in the going conCerns 
participants, to which they hold their talk and 
accountable. 
Accordingly, a constructionist analytics ""J, w';lh th, 
nial question of what realities and/or subjectivititj 
constructed in the myriad sites of everyday iife (see 
1999). In practice, diverse articulations of discourse ' 
collide, and work against the construction of common 
form subj"'ts, agcnts, and social realities. Inl.,m,'.',II;' 
in relation to tbe institutional and cultural markers 
ence, which, in turn, fiuctuate with respect to the ' 
in which social interaction unfolds. Di,IC01JfS,:s-ill" 
refract one another as they arc methodically""'""'''" 
cal exigencies. Local discursive practice makes 
impossible, instead serving up irUlovation, di', -ersificati< 
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variation (see Abu-Lughod, 1991, 1993; Chase, 1995; Narayan & 
George, 2002). 
DIVERSE DIRECTIONS 
Considering and emphasizing diverse analytic dimensions, 
variations on the constructionist analytics of interpretive prac-
tice continue to develop in innovative directions. Some are 110\"/ 
"maturing:' such as the "institutional ethnography" (IE) that 
Dorothy Smith and her colleagues have pioneered, and continue 
to expand. Others are of more recent vintage, such as the growth 
of discursive constructionism or Gubrium and Holstein's (2009) 
development of a constructionist analytics for narrative prac-
tice. Old or new, in their own fashions all take up the interplay of 
discursive practice and discourscs-in-practice, variously 
emphasizing the hows and the whals of everyday life. 
Ethnography of Narrative Practice 
Let us begin with a recent development centered on how to 
analyze the interpretive practices associated with narrative and 
storytelling. Karralive analysis has become a popular mode of 
qualitative inquiry over the pasttwo decades. If (almost) every-
one is a constructionist, today nearly everyone also seems to be 
doing what they call narrative analysis. As sophisticated and 
insightful as the new wave of narrative analysis has become, 
of this research is focused closely on texts of talk (e.g., 
Riessman, 1993). Researchers collect stories in interviews about 
myriad aspects of social life, then the stories are transcribed and 
analyzed for the way they emplot, thematize, and otherwise con-
struct what they are about. 
While attempts at narrative analysis have evinced construc-
tionist sensibilities from the start, the socially situated, unfold-
ing activeness of the narrative process has been shortchanged. 
The emphasis on the transcribed texts of stories tends to strip 
narratives of their social organization and interactional dynam-
ics) casting narrative as a social product, not as social process. 
Emphasis is more on the text-based whats of the story and how 
is organized, than on the hows of narrative production. Paul 
Atkin,;on (1997). among others, promotes a shift in focus: 
The ubiquity of the narrative and its centrality. , , are not license 
simply to privilege those forms. It is the work of anthropologists 
and sociologists to examine those narratives and to sub.iect them 
to the same analysis as any other forms. We need to par dLle atten-
tion to their construction in usc: how actors improvise their per-
sonal narratives .... Vlenccd to attend to how socially shared 
resources of rhetoric and narrative are deployed togeneratt: recog-
nizable, plausible, and culturally well-informed accounts. (p. 341) 
This reorientation encourages researchers to consider the 
circumstances, conditions, and goals of narratives----:-hovl 
storytellers work up and accomplish things with the accounts 
they produce. Adapting once morc from Wittgenstein (1953, 
1958), storytellers not ordytdl stories, they do things with them. 
Capitalizing on Atkinson"s and others suggestion, we have 
recently turned our brand of constructionist analytics to issues 
of narrative production (see Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). The 
challenge is to capture narrative's active, socially situated 
dimensions by moving outside of story texts to the occasions 
and practical activities of story construction and storytelling. 
By venturing into the domain of narrative practice, we gain 
access to the content of accounts and their internal organiza-
tion, to the communicative conditions and resources surround-
ing how narratives are assembled, conveyed, and received, and 
to storytelling'S everyday consequences. 
The focus on practice highlights the reflexive interplay 
bet'i-veen discursive practice and discourse-in-practice. The nar-
rative analysis of story transcripts may be perfectly adequate for 
capturing the internal dynamics and organization of stories, but 
it isolates those stories from their interactional and institutional 
moorings. For example, a transcript may not reveal a setting's 
discursive conventions, such as what is usually talked about, 
avoided, or discouraged under the circumstances. It may not 
reveal the consequences of a particular narrative told in a spe-
cillc way. In order to understand how narrative operates in 
everyday life, we need to know the details and mediating condi-
tions of nanative occasions. These details can only be discerned 
from direct consideration of the mutually constitutive interplay 
between ,,,,hat we have called ('narrative work''' and <'narrative 
environments:' 
Narrative work refers to the interactional activity through 
,,,,,,hich narratives are constructed, communicated, sustained, or 
reconfigured. The leading questions here are, "How can the pro-
cess of constructing accounts be conceptuallzedt' and "Hm,\-T can 
the empirical process be analyzed?" Some of this is visible in 
story transcripts, but typically, narrative analysts tend to strip 
these transcripts of tlleir interactional and institutional con-
texts and conversational character. This commonly results in the 
transcribed narrative appearing as a more-or-less finished, self-
contained product. The in situ work of producing the narrative 
within the !low of conversational interaction disappears. 
To recapture some of this narrative activity, ".~e examine 
narrative practice for some of the ways in which narratives are 
activated or incited (see Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, 2000b). 
Working by way of analytic bracketing, these studies concen-
trate on conversational dynamics, machinery~ and emerging 
sequential environments (many traditional CA concerns), 
while retaining sensitivity to broader contextual issues. Other 
studies focus on narrative linkages and composition, the ways 
in which horizons of meaning are narratively constructed (see 
Gubrium, 1993b; Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). Studies of narra-
tive performativity document the ways in which narratives are 
produced and conveyed in and for particular circumstances 
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and audiences (see Bauman, 1986; Abu-Lughod, 1993; Ochs & Holstein, 2008, 2009).' Applied to storytelling, this ethnographic 
Capps, 2001). Collaboration and control are additional key con - approach is attuned to the discursive dynamics and contours of 
cerns in analyzing narrative practice (see Holstein & Gubrium, narrative practice. It provides opportunities for the close scru· 
1995, 2000b; Norrick, 2000; Young, 1995). Because they are tiny of narrative circumstances, their actors, and actions in the 
interactionally produced, narratives are eminently social process of constructing accounts. This clearly resonates witb 
accomplishments. contextua lly rich work done ill the ethnography of communica· 
The other side of our anal)1ics of narrative practice centers tion (Hymes, 1964), the study of orally performed narratives 
on narrative environments-contexts within which the work of (Baumilll, 1986; Briggs & Bauman, 1992; Oehs & Capp,,2001j, 
narrative construction gets done. Narratives are assembled and and ethnographically grounded studies of folk narratives 
told to someone, somewhere, at some time, with a variety of (Glassie, 1995,2006). 
consequences for those concerned. (In contrast to CA, we do not Concern with the production, distribution, and circulation of I 
limit narrative environments to the machinery of speech stories in society requi res that we step outside of narrative texts 
exchanges.) AU of th is has a discernible impact on how stories and consider questions such as who produces particular kinds 
emerge, whai is communicated, and to what ends. The environ- of stories, where are they likely to be encountered, what are their 
ments of storytelling shape the content and internal organiza- purposes and consequences, who are the listeners, under what 
tion of accounts) just as internal matters can have an impact on circumstances are particular narratives more or less account-
one's role as a storyteller. In turning to narrative environments, able, how do they gain acceptance, and how are they challenged? 
the analytic emphasis is more on the whats of narrative reality Ethnographic fieldwork helps supply the answers. In systemati· 
than on its hows, although, once again, analytic bracketing cally observing the construction, use, and reception of nana· 
makes this a matter of temporary emphasis, not excl usiye focus. tives, we have found that their internal organi '<ltion, while 
One key question here is, "How is the meaning of a narrative important to understand in its own right, does not tell us much 
influenced by the particular setting in whiclh it is produced, with about how stories operate in society. This does not diminish the 
the setting's distinctive understandings, concerns, and resources, explanatory value of text-based narrative analysis, but instead 
rather than in another setting, with different circumstances?" A highlights what might be added to that approach if we attended 
second question is, "What are the purposes and consequences of ' .. to narrative practice. 
narrating experience ill particular ways!" A turn to the narrative 
environments of storytelling is critical for understanding what 
is at stake for storytellers and listeners in presenting accounts or 
responding to them in distinctive ways. 
A growing body of work addresses such questions in relation 
to formal and informal settings and organizations, from fami-
lies, to friendship networks, professions, and occupations (see 
Gubrium & Holstein, 2009). The comparative ethnographies of 
therapeutic organizations conducted by Miller (1997a) and 
Weinberg (2005) are exemplary in this regard. The inlluence of 
narrative environments is portrayed even more strikingly in Out 
of Control: Family· Therapy and Domestic Disorder (Gubrium, 
1992), which describes the narrative production of domestic 
troubles in distinctly different family therapy agencies. Susan 
Chase's (1995) Ambiguous Empowerment: The Work Narratives 
of Women School Superintelldellts and Ami r 1larvasti', (2003) 
Being Homeless: Textual and Narrative Construelions offer 
nuanced exami nations of the accounts of some of society's most 
and least successful members, accenting the environmentally 
sensitive narrative work that is done to construct vastly different 
accounts of life and its clhallenges. 
To move beyond transcribed lexts, narrative analysis requires 
a methodology that captures the broad and variegated landscape 
of narrative practice. 1.0 essence, the researcher must be willing to 
move outside stories themselves and into the interactional, cul-
tural, and institutional fields of narrative production, bringing 
on board a narrative ethnography of storytel1ing (see Gubrium & 
Institutional Ethnography 
Another approaclh relating discursive practice and discoutle-
in-practice is Smith's "institutional ethnography" (IE) 'csearch 
programS IE emerged out of Smith's (1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1999, 
2005) feminist work that explored the ruptures between women's 
everyday experience and dominant forms of knowledge that, 
while seemingly neutral and general, concealed particular stand-
points grounded in gender, race, and class (McCoy, 2008). The 
approach takes the everyday world as both its point of departllrr 
and its problematic. Inquiry begins with ongoing activities of 
actual people in the world, "starting where people are;' as Smith 
characteristically puts it. The aim is to map the translaeal pro-
cesses of administration and governance that shape lives and 
circumstances by way of the linkages of ruUng relations . Recog· 
nizing that such connections are accomplished primarily through 
what is often called tex1ually mediated social organization, IE 
focuses on texts-in-use in multiple settings. Across a range of 
locations-embodying people's everyday concerns, professional, 
administrative and management practices, and policy making-
IE studies examine the actual activities that coordinate these 
interconnected sites (see DeVault & McCoy,2002). 
The dominant form of coordination is what Smith calls "rul-
ing relations" -a mode of knowledge that involves the "contin-
ual transcriptioll of the local and particular activities of OUT 
lives into abstracted and generalized forms . .. and the creation 
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in texts as a site of action" (Smith, 1987, p. 3). In IE, 
orients the analyst to forms of representation (written 
visual, digital, or numeric) that exist materially separate 
embodied consciousness. Such texts provide mediating 
between people across time and place, making it 
to generate knowledge separate from individuals who 
such knowledge. Modern governance and large·scale 
~ot(linaltion occur through rapidly proliferating, generalized, 
generalizing, text-based forms of knowledge. These texts 
the "ruling relations [that generate 1 forms of con-
and organization that are objectified in the sense 
they are constituted externally to particular people and 
2005, p. 13). But to appreciate how texts do their 
oordinal:ive· work, the researcher must view them "in action" as 
produced, used, and oriented to by particular people in 
institutional courses of action (see DeVault & McCoy, 
Therein lie the institutional and ethnographic dimensions of 
leaplproach. In IE, "institution" refers to coordinated and inter-
work processes and courses of action. "Ethnography" 
wncrete modes of inquiry used to discover and describe 
activities. The IE researcher's goal is not to generalize 
people under study, but to identify and explain social 
that have generalizing effects. Practitioners of IE 
~lfacteristically have critical or liberatory goals, an aim that 
address shortly. They pursue inquiry to elucidate the 
deol,agic:al and social processes that produce the experience of 
wmilnati()D and subordination. As Smith and colleagues often 
out, institutional ethnography offers a sociology for peo-
just about them (see DeVault & McCoy, 2002; McCoy, 
t.1R· .llmith2005). 
1Ylwt:1Lis not typically categorized as a variant of construe-
(McCoy, 2008), its conceptual antecedents and empiri-
interests often converge with the general constructionist 
especially with respect to the ways in which discursive 
and constraints affect social life and social forms, 
on textually (discursively) mediated social relations, 
examine how forms of consciousness and organiza-
objectified or constituted as if they were external to 
people and places. IE analysis, however, strives to 
that, at the same time, seemingly obdurate forms of social 
re realized in concerted actions-produced, used, and 
to by actual persons in ongoing, institutional courses 
(McCoy, 2008; Smith, 2005). From the standpoint ofIE, 
";"t,",·,),,, between structures and agency is key to the social 
trganiizati(JU of lived experience. 
As an alternative "sociology for people;' IE has been adopted 
researchers working in a wide variety of disciplines and 
in education, social work, nursing and other health 
as well as sociology (see McCoy 2008; Smith, 2006). 
a general sense, IE addresses the socially organized and 
"work" done in varied domains of everyday life. 
Work is construed in a very broad sense-activities that 
involve conscious intent and acquired skill; including emo-
tional and thought work as well as physical labor or communi-
cative action. It is not confined to occupational employment, 
although this form of work is also ripe for analysis. Marjorie 
DeVault (1991), for example, has examined the work of feeding 
a family, while several IE studies have investigated various 
aspects of mothers' experience and the deeply consequential 
mothering work done by women in diverse domestic and orga-
nizational settings (see Brown, 2006; Griffith & Smith, 2004; 
Weigt, 2006). Other studies have examined the situated experi-
ence of living with HIY infection (Mykhalovskiy & McCoy, 
2002), child rearing and housing (Luken & Vaughan, 2006), 
nursing home care (Diamond, 1992), and job training and 
immigrant labor (Grahame, J 998). IE investigations con-
ducted in more formal (occupational) work settings include 
studies of the work performed by teachers (Manicom, 1995), 
security guards (Walby, 200j), social workers (De Montigny, 
1995), nurses (Campbell & Jackson, 1992; Rankin & Campbell, 
2006), and policing in the gay community (G. Smith, 1988). 
Across these IE studies, the goal is to discover how lives are 
socially organized and coordinated. The analytic basis for all 
these projects is to display the interplay between institutional 
practices and individual actions. If IE resists a constructionist 
designation, it nonetheless shares many of the sensibilities 
embodiedm a constructionist analytics. 
Discursive Constructionism 
Another innovative approach has been grouped loosely 
under the banners of discursive constructionism, or DC, and 
discourse analysis, or DA (see Potter, 1996; Potter & Hepburn, 
2008). Its constructionist analytics also centers on the interplay 
of interpretive practice. As Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn 
(2008) note, the DC label is itself a construction that supplies a 
particular sense of coherence to a body of more-or-Iess related 
work. If it is not singularly programmatic, it nevertheless repre-
sents a cogent analytic perspective that addresses the reflexive 
complexity of social interaction. 
Centering attention on everyday conversations, arguments, 
talk-at-work, and other occasions where people are interacting, 
DC focuses on action and practice rather than linguistic struc-
ture. The approach emerged from the discourse analytic tradi-
tion in the sociology of scientific knowledge (e,g., Gilbert & 
Mulkay, 1984) and withi.n a broader perspective developed 
within social psychology (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987; see 
Hepburn, 2003). It is indebted in many ways to ethnomethodol-
ogy (especially work by Harvey Sacks), and draws heavily on CA 
methods and findings. DC differs from CA, however, because it 
explicitly brings substantive issues of social construction to the 
fore; it is more concerned with the whats of social interaction 
than CA generally has been, While there are many other subtle 
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distinctions, areas of overlap are substantial (Wooftltt, 2005), 
and in recent years DC and CA have found increasing areas of 
convergence (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). 
DC approaches social construction in two fashions. In one) 
investigation aims to describe how discourse is constructed in 
the sense that it is assembled from a range of different resources 
with different degrees of structural organization. At the most 
basic level, these resources are words and grammatical struc-
tures, but they also include broader elements such as categories, 
metaphors, idioms, rhetorical conventions, and interpretive rep-
ertoires. The second approach emphasizes the constructive 
aspects of discourse in the sense that assemblages of words, rep-
ertoires, categories, and the like assemble and produce stabilized 
versions of the world and its actions and events. Central to DC is 
the notion that discourse does far more than describe objective 
states of affairs; it is llsed to construct versions of the 'world that 
are organized for particular purposes (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). 
Following this commitment, DC treats all discourse as situ-
ated. At one level, it is located in the sequential environment of 
conversation (see Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) and other 
forms of mediated interaction (e.g., turn allocation in legal or 
medical proceedings, screen prompts on computer displays). On 
another level, discourse is institutionally embedded. That is, it is 
generated within, and gives sense and structure to routine, 
ongoing practices such as family conversations, shopping trans-
actions, and twelve-step meetings, for example. On a third level, 
discourse is situated rhetorically, in that discursive construc-
tions are produced to advocate a particular version and counters 
possible alternatives (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). In this regard, 
analysis of the interest-related and consequential whats of dis-
cursive constructions is imperative. 
V,chile DC incorporates a view of discourse-in-practice, it 
stops short of the extended notion of discourse used in some of 
Foucault's work. DC's view of discourse is more restricted, 
emphasizing its use in everyday practice. Nevertheless, DC is 
dynamic and flexible enough to potentially address phenomena 
that Foucauldian analysis might also contemplate, or to con-
script some of Foucault's insights about institutions, practice, 
and the nature of subjectivity into its own service (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2008). For example, Margret Wetherell (1998) argues 
that social identities calmot be understood apart from consid-
eration of the discourses that provide the subject positions 
through which those identities are produced. 
DC is not a "coherent and scaled system" (Potter & Hepburn, 
2008, p. 291). Its field of interest is extremely broad, including 
but not restricted to, studies in discursive psychology and social 
psychology (e.g., Edwards, 2005; Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Hepburn, 2003; Potter, 2003; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), cognition 
(e.g., Potter & te Molder, 2005), race and racism (e.g., Wetherell 
& Potter, 1992), gender (see Speer & Stokoe, in press), age (e.g., 
Nikander, 2002), facts (e.g., Wooffitt, 1992), and emotion 
(Edwards, 1999). 
DC is not without its analytic tensions. For example, the issue 
of social structure and context remains a subject of debate. 
There is considerable contention regarding how the researcher 
might analyze utterances within conversation with an eye to 
identifying transcending disconrses'csubject positions, or reper-
toires. As in Foucauldian or critical discourse analysis (see, for 
example, Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijic, 1993; Wodak & Meyer, 
2009), the issue is how critically to address the substantive 
whats of social construction while attending to the interactional 
dynamics and circumstances that construct them (Wooffitt, 
2005). The danger in turning too fully to the study of transcen-
dent discourse (writ large) is that it can shortchange the artful 
human conduct and agency involved in discursive practice 
(Wooffitt,2005). 
Ji!\ SUSTAINING A CRITICAL CONSCIOUSI\ESS 
This brings us to the concluding issue of how to maintain a 
critical consciousness in constructionist research while 
upholding a commitment to the neutral stance of bracketing. 
We have just noted that this is a desire shared by both DC and 
IE. But it does pose competing aims: documenting the social 
construction of reality, on the one hand, and criticallyattend-
ing to dominant and marginalized discourses and their effects 
on oUr-lives, on the other. Exclusive attention to the construc" 
tive hows of interpretive practice cannot by itself sustain a 
critical consciousness. 
Our way of addressing the issue comes by way of analytic 
bracketing. Our constructionist analytics sustains a critical 
consciousness by exploiting the critical potential of the analytic 
interplay of discourse-in-practice and discursive practice. 
Attending to both the constitutive haws and substantive wha~ 
of interpretive practice provides two different platforms for 
critique. The continuing enterprise of analytic bracketing does 
not keep us comfortably ensconced thronghout the research 
process in a domain of indifterence to the lived realities of "'P'-
rience, as phenomenological bracketing does. Nor does anal)1ic 
bracketing keep us engaged in the unrepentant naturalism of 
documenting the world of everyday life as if it were fully objec-
tive and obdurate. Rather, it continuously rescues us from the 
analytic lethargies of both endeavors. 
When questions of discourse-in-practice take the stage, 
there are grounds for problemati.ing or politicizing what 
wise might be too facilely viewed as socially or individualisti-
cally constructed, managed, and sustained. The persistent 
urgency of what questions cautions us not to assume 
agency, artfulness, or the machinery of social interaction' 
whole story. The urgency prompts us to inquire into broader 
environments illld contingencies that are built up ernn.«time 
and circumstance in discursive practice. These are the 
poraneous conditions that inform and shape the construction 
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and the personal and interpersonal consequences of 
constituted the world in a particular way. While a con-
view toward interpretive practice does not orient 
i!~ra.listi call!y to the "real world" as such, neither does it take 
as built from the ground up in talk-in-interaction 
and every communicative occasion. This allows for 
lin"l" 'oolirie,1 observations since the analytics can point us 
matters of social organization and control that implicate 
beyond immediate interaction. It turns us to wider 
(as constructed as they may be) in search of sources of 
,control, change, or stability. 
discursive practice commands the analytic spotlight, 
grounds for critically challenging the representational 
of taken-far-granted realities. Researchers unsettle 
fu."'Cc'nstl:uct taken-for-granted realities in search of their 
to reveal the constitutive processes that produce 
them. Criticaily framed , persistent how questions 
us to bear in mind that the everyday realities of our 
;- j,hether they are being normal, abnormal, law-abiding, 
·,mal,maIe,female, young, or old-are realities we do. Hav-
tbem, they can be undone. We can move on to dis -
and reassemble realities, producing and reproducing, 
again, the world we inhabit. Politically, tbis recognizes 
the world we inhabit, we could enact alternate possibili-
ttPr ,/t"rn;ati,'edirecti,ons, even if commonsense understand-
this seem impossible. If we make visible the con-
fluidity and malleability of social forms, we also reveal 
for change (see Gubr ium & Holstein, 1990, 1995; 
& Gubrium, 1994, 2000b, 2004, 2008). 
critical consciousness -of a constructionist analytics 
the continuous imperative to take issue with discourse 
<lli,:urs,i', "e practice when either one is foregrounded in 
or seemingly obdurate in everyday life, thus turning 
,ana'YlilCs on itself as it pursues its goals. In this sense, ana-
b"tck"tirlg is its own form of critical consciousness. 
framed, tbe interplay of discourse-in-practice and 
practice transforms analytic bracketing into critical 
offering a basis not only for documenting interpre-
but also for critically commenting on its own 
; Some self-proclaimed ethnomethodologists, however, might 
notion that ethnomethodology is in any sense a "conslruc-
"const ruc tivist" enterprise (see Lynch, 1993, 2008). Some 
of the ethnomethodological canon also clearly imply that 
:uucnOll.lsm is anathema to the ethnornethodological project (sec 
1998; Maynard & Clayman, 1991 ). 
dearly reflecting Garfinkel's pioneering contributions, 
.th'~"teri"tion of the ethnomethodological project is perhaps 
closer to the version comTeyed in the work of Melvin Palloer (1987, 
1991) and D. Lawrence Wieder (1988) than some of the more recent 
"postanalytic" or com .. ersation analytic forms of ethnomethodology. 
Indeed, Garfinkel (1988,2002), Lynch (1993), and others might object 
to how we ourselves portray ethnomcthodology. "We would contend, 
however, that there is mllch to be gained fmm a studied "misreading" 
of the ethnomethodological "classics," a practice that Garfinkel himself 
advocates for the sociological classics more generally (see Lynch, 
1993). With the figuralive "dealh of the author" (Rarthes, t 977), those 
attached to doctrinaire readings of the canon should have little ground 
for argument. 
3. OLber elhnomethodologists have drawn upon Foucaldt, but 
without necessarily endorsing these affinities or parallels. Lynch 
((993), for example, wriles that Foucault's studies can be relevant to 
ethnomethodological investigations in a "restricted and 'literal' way" 
(p. ]31), and resists the generalization of discursive regimes across 
highly occasioned "language games:' See McHoul (1986) and Lyocll 
and Bogen (1996) for exemplary ethnomethodological appmpriations 
of FoucauJdian insights. 
4. There are other useful metaphors for describing how anal)~ie 
bracketing changes the focus from discourse·in·practice to discursive 
practice. One can liken the operation to shifting gears while driving a 
motor vehicle equipped with a manu al transmission. One mode of 
analysis may prove quite productive, but it will eventually strain 
against the resistance engenuered by its own temporary analytic ori· 
entation. When the researcher notes that the-analytic engine is labor-
ingunder, orbcing constrained by, the rc.-straints of 'what it is currently 
geared to accom-plish. she can decide tu virtually shift ana~'tic gears in 
order to gain further purchase 0 11 the aspects of interpretive interplay 
that were previously bracketed. Just as there can be no pft.'scription for 
shifting gears while driving (i.e., one can never speci fy in advance at 
what speed one should shift up or down), changing analytic brackets 
always remains an artful enterprise, awaiting the empirical circum-
stances it encounters. Its timing cannot. be prespecified. I.ike shifting 
gears while driving, changes are nol arbitrary or undiscipl i.ned. Rather 
they respond to the analytic challenges at hand in a principled, if not 
predelermined, fashion. 
S. This may be the very thing Lynch (1993) decries with respect to 
conversation analysts who attempt to formalize and professionalize 
CA as a "scientific" discipline. 
6. Some critics (sec Denzin, 1998) have worried that analytic 
bracketing represents a sdcctive objectivism, u form of "ontological 
gerrymandering." These, oi course, have become fighting words 
among constructionists. But ·we should soberlrrecall that Steve 'Woolgar 
and Dorothy Pawluch (l 985) have suggested that carving outsome 
sort of analytic foot ing may be a pervasive and-unavoidable feature of 
any sociological commentary. Our own constant attention to the inter-
play between discourse-in-practice and discursive practice continu-
ally reminds us of their reflexive relationship. Gerrymanderers stand 
their separate ground and unrefle:dvely dccnnstruct; analytic bracket-
ing, incontrasl, encourages a continual and methodical deconstruc-
tion of empirical groundings themselves. This may produce a less-
than-tidy picture, bot it also is designed to keep rein.cation at bay and 
ungrounded signification under control. 
7. The term "narrative ethnography;" \\'hicb is an apt d.esignation 
for an elhnographic approach to narrative. is also associated with 
-
, . 
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anodler approach to qualitative inquiry.Some r.,earchers have applied 
the term to the critical analysis of representational practices in eth-
nography. Their aim is to work against the objectifying practices of 
ethnographic des.cription. Practitioners of this form of narrative eth-
nography use the term to high light researchers' narrative praclices as 
they craft ethnographic accounts. They feature the interplay between 
the ethnographer's own subjectivity and the subjcctivities of those 
whose lives and worlds are in view. Their ethnographic texts are typi-
. cally derived from participant observation, but afe distinctive because 
they take special notice of the researcher's own participation, perspec-
tiYe, voice, and especially his or her emotional experience as these 
operate in relation to the field of experience in view. Anthropologists 
Barbara Tedlock (1 991, 1992, 2004), Ruth Behar (1993, 1996), and 
Kirin Narayan (1989), and sociologists Carolyn Ellis (1991), Laurel 
Richardson (1990a, 1990b), and others (Ellis & Flaherty, 1992; hIlis & 
Bochoer, 1996) are important proponents of this genre. The refieri,'e, 
representational engagements of field encounters are discu.s:soo at 
length in H. 1. Goodall's (2000) book \\\·iting the New Ethnography, 
while Carolyn Ellis (2004) offers a description of the auto ethnographic 
approach to narrari"oes. 
8. According to McCoy (2008), institutional ethnographers gener-
ally resist the tendenc}" to be subsumed under the constructionist 
umbrella. By not affiliating with constructionism, she argues, IE has 
been free to partidpate 111 constructionist conversations, but on its 
own terms. This independent posilioning is important for the IE proj-
ect that aims to begin, not from theoretical vanlage points, but from 
the actualities of people's lives. 
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